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The separation of ownership and management is an important feature of the 
development of the modern enterprise, which forms the principal-agent relationship 
including moral hazard and adverse selection problems.From both theoretical and practical 
perspective, it is a critical topic to design an effective incentive mechanism between 
shareholders and management to reduce agency costs and improve corporate governance. 
Stock options, restricted stocks and other equity incentive plans are widely used and have 
achieved good results in the developed capital markets. However,they had unsatisfactory 
effects to some extend in listed companies of China. How to improve the effect of equity 
incentive plan is one of the hot topics in both research and practical field of corporate 
governance. 
    There are five parts in this paper. First part introduced the background, ideas and 
meanings. Second part reviewed the basic theories and empirical findings of equity 
incentive plan,including agency theory,human capital theory and so on.then summarized 
as stock incentive plan relevance theory and stock incentive irrelevance theory.In the third 
part, described the background and history of equity incentive plan in the public  
companies of China, and analyzed several common equity incentive method and classic 
cases for application with their advantages and disadvantages. In the fourth part, we 
analyzed a stock incentive plan for SuZhou Goodark in detail,from its background of 
incentive plan,plan design and the effectiveness of incentive plan, then compared financial 
information in historical and peer data in stock incentive period,analyzed the positive and 
negative of respectively,then we summarized the problems of plan design, accounting 
measurement and tax treatment in that stock incentive plan and summarized several 
conclusions and suggestions. 
Through the case analysis of equity incentive plan on Goodark, the equity incentive 
plan has achieved the effectiveness to some extent, with the proper selection on the 
module, focused target eligible employees, and the accurate indexes and reasonable terms 
for the exercise condition. At the same time, problems still exist regarding how to set the 
more comprehensive evaluation objectives and how to be more accurate in accounting 
measurement. Based on related theoretical research and current situation of capital market 















incentive plan for public companies. First is increase the relative value index, cash 
percentage of net income and build up multiple level objectives for the evaluation system 
such as Dupont analysis of ROE. The second is to adjust the exercise price, to offset the 
irrational volatility of market and industry cycle.In order to emphasize the real motivation 
effectiveness of the equity incentive plan.We hope to make a few beneficial suggestions 
for the theoretical research and practical work in equity incentive field. 
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Exchange Committee，SEC）的抽样调查发现：二十世纪末，美国排名前 1000 的公
司中，有 90%以上的公司对经营层授予了股权激励，股权激励在经营层总收入中的比
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